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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS REASSESSMENT
ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING ROKG INTERNAL SITUATION BASED ON
VIEWS OF COUNTRY TEAM:

1. VIEWED FROM SEOUL, COLLAPSE OF VIETNAM AND
CAMBODIA APPEARS CAUSED IN LARGE MEASURE BY INTERNAL
WEAKNESSES - CORRUPTION, INEFFICIENCY, REPRESSION
OF DISSENT, LACK OF BROAD REPRESENTATION, ISOLATION
FROM POPULACE - OF RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, WHICH
DEPRIVED THEM OF POPULAR SUPPORT. MILITARY REVERSES
REVEALED COMBINATION OF LEADERSHIP AND PLANNING
FAILURES, LACK OF DISCIPLINE AND WILL TO FIGHT, AND
INABILITY EFFECTIVELY TO EMPLOY U.S. AID.
ADMINISTRATIVE WEAKNESSES AND PUBLIC SUSCEPTIBILITY
TO PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES APPEARED
SERIOUSLY AGGRAVATED BY DRAWDOWN OF U.S. PRESENCE.

THIS HAS LED COUNTRY TEAM TO EXAMINE KOREAN
INTERNAL SITUATION WITH VIEW TO REACHING SOME
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHETHER KOREA IS POTENTIALLY
ANOTHER VIETNAM. WHAT FOLLOWS IS DISTILLATE OF
SUBJECTIVE OPINIONS DRAWN FROM MEMBERS OF COUNTRY
TEAM WITH RESPECT TO SERIES OF NINE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
NATIONAL UNITY OF ROK, POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ROKG AND
ITS LEADERSHIP, AND STRENGTH OF NATIONAL WILL AND
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CONFIDENCE IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT TO CARRY OUT
POLICIES AND TO RESIST ATTACK OR SUBVERSION.

IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THAT KOREAN NATIONAL

COHESION AND PRO-AMERICAN ORIENTATION HAVE NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY ERODED BY SOUTHEAST ASIAN COLLAPSE OR REPRESSIONS PRACTICED BY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OF PRESIDENT PAK CHUNG-HUI. ANTI-PAK SENTIMENTS HAVE EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY IN RECENT YEARS BUT POLITICAL OPPOSITION IS POORLY LED, WEAKLY ORGANIZED AND KEPT UNDER TIGHT REIN BY HIGHLY REFINED CONTROL SYSTEM. THERE NO SIGN THAT MILITARY LEADERSHIP WHICH REMAINS ULTIMATE BASE OF REGIME'S POWER, IS ANTHING BUT LOYAL TO REGIME. ANTI-COMMUNISM, BASED PRIMARILY ON FEAR OF NORTH KOREAN ATTACK, REMAINS IDEOLOGICAL GLUE WHICH HELPS HOLD NATION TOGETHER, BACKED BY RESERVOIR OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN SUCCESS WITH WHICH REGIME HAS MANAGED ECONOMY.

POSSIBILITY FOR EROSION OF NATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND COHESION EXISTS. SUCH EROSION COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY SOME COMBINATION OF PROLONGED REPRESSION, CHANGED PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THREAT FROM NORTH, ECONOMIC REVERSES, AND LOSS OF FAITH IN RELIABILITY OF U.S. COMMITMENT. CONTINUATION OF U.S. PRESENCE AND COMMITMENT IN FACT UNDERLIES ALL POSITIVE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT FUTURE OF ROK, WHETHER IN TERMS OF ITS ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND AGAINST NORTH KOREAN ATTACK OR LIKELIHOOD THAT IT WILL HAVE CHANCE TO THROW OFF PRESENT AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOP INTO SEMBLANCE OF DEMOCRATIC STATE.

IN ABSENCE ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS, PAK APPEARS BOTH DETERMINED AND LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO RULE THROUGH FORCE OF WILL, SUPPRESSION OF WOULD-BE SUCCESSORS, REPRESSION OF DISSENT, AND CONTROL SYSTEM FROM WHOSE ELEMENTS HE DEMANDS ABSOLUTE LOYALTY. HOWEVER, THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT COUNTRY WILL OUTGROW SYSTEM WHICH GOVERNS IT NOW AND THAT REGIME MAY EVENTUALLY HAVE TO GIVE VOICE
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IN GOVERNMENT TO FAST DEVELOPING POOL OF RESPONSIBLE AND CABLE MANAGERS, TECHNICIANS AND SCHOLARS THAT HAS BEEN CREATED BY ITS OWN SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES. END SUMMARY.

2. ASSUMPTION I: GOVERNMENT OF PAK CHUNG-HUI HAS SUPPORT OF MAJORITY

ALTHOUGH IT MUST BE HEAVILY QUALIFIED, JUDGMENT ON VALIDITY OF THIS ASSUMPTION REMAINS ON POSITIVE SIDE. ASSUMPTION MUST BE VIEWED ON VARIOUS LEVELS, IN TERMS OF POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT AS INSTITUTION, TOWARD POLICIES IT HAS

FOLLOWED, TOWARD STYLE AND SYSTEM WHICH PAK HAS DEVELOPED, AND FINALLY, SINCE HE HAS SO COMPLETELY PERSONALIZED REGIME UNDER HIS CONTROL, TOWARD PAK HIMSELF. ON EACH OF THESE LEVELS, SUPPORT IS LESS THAN PERFECT AND IS BASED MORE ON FACTORS OF DISCIPLINE, CONTROL AND LACK OF AN ALTERNATIVE THAN ON POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WITH SYSTEM, ITS POLICIES AND IDEOLOGY, OR MAN WHO CONTROLS IT.

MAJORITY OF KOREAN PEOPLE, INTERESTED PRIMARILY IN LIVELIHOOD, DO NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORT OR EVEN IDENTIFY WITH GOVERNMENT. WHILE KOREANS HAVE STRONG SENSE OF NATIONHOOD, AT INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL, QUESTION IS SIMPLY WHETHER GOVERNMENT RULES EFFECTIVELY, PROVIDES BENEFITS AND MEETS EXPECTATIONS. HAVING NO MEANS OF AFFECTING GOVERNMENT POLICY OR OF CHOOSING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, MAJORITY OF POPULATION IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MANIPULATION THROUGH EXTENSIVE NETWORK OF GOVERNMENT CONTROLS. POPULACE HAS VERY FEW OPTIONS; TO REMAIN PASSIVE AND OBEY, TRUSTING THAT GOVERNMENT WILL ACT IN NATION'S BEST INTERESTS, OR TO INDULGE IN MASSIVE PROTESTS IF GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES AND ACTIONS BECOME INTOLERABLE. BUT THRESHOLD OF TOLERANCE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAS BEEN HIGH AND PAK REGIME, BY KOREAN STANDARDS, HAS GOVERNED VERY EFFECTIVELY IN MOST AREAS.

POLICIES PAK GOVERNMENT HAS FOLLOWED PROBABLY
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DO HAVE APPROVAL OF MOST KOREANS. CONCENTRATION ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ON RAISING LEVELS OF LIVING, NOTABLY SUCCESSFUL OVER PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE WON PAK REGIME CONSIDERABLE CREDIT FROM KOREAN PEOPLE. REGIME'S POLITICAL/MILITARY POSTURE - FEATURING ANTI-COMMUNISM, STRONG AND INCREASINGLY SELF-RELIANT MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST ATTACK FROM NORTH, AND RELIANCE ON ALLIANCE WITH UNITED STATES - IS CONSONANT WITH POPULAR ATTITUDES AND ESPOUSED BY POLITICAL OPPOSITION AS WELL.

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DIVISION OF OPINION BECOMES ACUTE WHEN STYLE OF PAK REGIME UNDER YUSHIN SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED. VIRTUALLY ALL KOREANS WOULD ACCEPT PROPOSITION THAT ROK NEEDS STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR VARIETY OF REASONS - TO CONTROL TRAITS INHERENT IN NATIONAL CHARACTER OF FACTIONALISM AND CONFRONTATION, TO COMPENSATE FOR SHALLOWNESS OF GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS AND EXPERIENCE, TO MAINTAIN UNITY AND DISCIPLINE AGAINST POPULARLY ACCEPTED THREAT FROM NORTH, AND TO ENSURE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. PAK HAS CREATED STRONG SYSTEM FOR THESE PURPOSES AND IN PROCESS MANY WHO WORK WITHIN THAT SYSTEM, INCLUDING POLITICIANS, MILITARY, BUREAUCRACY AND BUSINESSMEN, HAVE DEVELOPED VESTED INTEREST IN ITS RETENTION. MOST OF THOSE WHO FALL WITHIN THESE GROUPS, REGARDLESS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD PAK HIMSELF, CAN BE COUNTED AS ACTIVE SUPPORTERS AND MASS OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BENEFITED BY ECONOMIC ADVANCES AND ARE NOT TOUCHED BY REPRESSIVE ACTIONS ACCEPT REGIME AND, IF ONLY FOR LACK VIABLE ALTERNATIVE, DO NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE IT.

HOWEVER, CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN REGIME'S HAND, AND DISTASTEFUL AND ARBITRARY MEASURES PAK HAS TAKEN TO RESTRICT POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISSENT HAVE POLARIZED OPPOSITION TO YUSHIN SYSTEM AMONG SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF POPULATION, INCLUDING STUDENTS, INTELLIGENTSIA, CHRISTIANS AND EDUCATED URBAN
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POPULATION IN GENERAL. THESE GROUPS, MOST EXPOSED TO FOREIGN THOUGHT AND OPINION, HAVE BEEN MOST RESENTFUL OF PAK'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER AND MOST ARTICULATE IN EXPRESSING DESIRE FOR CHANGE. PAK'S INCREASING AUTHORITARIANISM HAS CAUSED THEM TO FOCUS THEIR ATTACKS DIRECTLY ON ELIMINATION OF YUSHIN SYSTEM AND MAN WHO CONTROLS IT. IT IS THEREFORE ON THESE GROUPS THAT WEIGHT OF SYSTEM PAK HAS CREATED - HARASSMENT AND SURVEILLANCE BY A PERVASIVE SECURITY APPARATUS, CENSORSHIP OF VARYING DEGREES AND SUBLETY, RESTRICTIONS IN SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY, PENetration AND SUBVERSION, AND HARSH LEGAL ACTIONS AND PENALTIES - HAS FALLEN.

WHERE THESE GROUPS WELL ORGANIZED AND INTEGRATED

WITH ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE BENEFITED LEAST FROM ECONOMIC PROGRESS, THEY WOULD POSE SERIOUS THREAT TO REGIME. THEY ARE NOT, HOWEVER, AND RECORD SHOWS THAT CONTROL APPARATUS HAS BEEN ABLE EFFECTIVELY TO STIFLE THEM. WHILE IMPACT OF REPRESSIVE MEASURES HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY PAK'S PROCLIVITY TO USE HARSH MEASURES TO PREEMPT ANY THREAT, THEIR NEGATIVE EFFECT HAS ALSO FREQUENTLY BEEN VITIATED BY NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS WHICH LEND CREDENCE TO PARK'S CLAIM THAT STRICT CONTROLS ON POLITICAL FREEDOMS AND ACTIVITIES ARE NECESSARY IN INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY TRUE IN PAST SIX MONTHS, WHEN DISCOVERY OF NORTH KOREAN TUNNELS, DEFEAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND PEKING VISIT BY KIM IL-SUNG HAVE AROUSED PUBLIC'S DEEP-SEATED SECURITY CONCERNS. THIS RESPONSE HAS CONVINCED EVEN OPPOSITION ELEMENTS THAT NOW IS NOT TIME TO CREATE DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES.

SYSTEM THUS APPEARS FIRMLY IN CONTROL FOR TIME BEING. GENERAL DISAFFECTION AND DISTASTE FOR REGIME HAS DOUBTLESS GROWN WITH PASSAGE OF YEARS, BUT IT IS DIFFUSED AND CONTROL APPARATUS WHICH DEALS WITH ACTIVE DISSIDENCE HAS BECOME CORRESPONDINGLY MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE. IN LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, SYSTEM WHICH CONCENTRATES ALL POLITICAL POWER IN CENTER SEEMS UNLIKELY TO SURVIVE. ITS GREATEST
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THREAT MAY NOT LIE WITHIN CURRENT ARRAY OF ACTIVE DISSIDENTS BUT IN RAPIDLY GROWING BODY OF SKILLED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PEOPLE, WHOSE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO MANAGE AND ADMINISTER A BROAD RANGE OF PROGRAMS IN OTHER FIELDS MAY LEAD TO DEMANDS FOR VOICE IN POLITICAL PROCESS AND NATIONAL POLICY AS WELL. IN THIS SENSE, REGIME COULD BE HOSTAGE TO ITS OWN DYNAMISM. IF SOME EXPLOSIVE INCIDENT DOES NOT DESTROY IT SOONER, IT MAY EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE TO POLITICAL PRESSURES INDUCED BY ITS OWN SUCCESSES, OR RAISE CONTROL MEASURES TO GREATER DEGREES OF REPRESSION.

PAK HIMSELF STANDS ALONE AND REMOTE AT APEX OF YUSHIN SYSTEM. REGIME IS EMBODIED IN HIS PERSON; WITHOUT HIM SYSTEM COULD NOT FUNCTION AND WITHOUT SYSTEM HE COULD NOT GOVERN. PAK HAS NEVER SOUGHT NOR EXPECTED POPULARITY OR EMOTIONAL SUPPORT FROM PUBLIC OR EVEN HIS OWN SUBORDINATES. HIS OVERRIDING CRITERION FOR ANY KEY SUBORDINATE IS COMPLETE LOYALTY, AND HE TAKES EXTRME PAINS TO PREVENT DISAFFECTION WITHIN GOVERNMENT APPARATUS. PAK IS GENUINELY ADMIRER BY GREAT MAJORITY FOR HIS UNDENIABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ALL BUT MOST

BITTER OPPOVNTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IS GENUINE
PATRIOT. NEVERTHELESS, HE RULES BY FORCE OF WILL,
BY HIS ABILITY TO DISPENSE SWIFT PUNISHMENT AS WELL
AS REWARD, AND THROUGH A PERVASIVE CONTROL APPARATUS
BASED ON IRON DISCIPLINE AND UNRELENTING ATTENTION
TO DETAILS. IN SHORT, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, PAK GETS
SUPPORT BECAUSE HE IS STILL IN POSITION TO DEMAND IT.

3. ASSUMPTION II: THAT PRESIDENT PAK IS DETERMINED TO
RULE INDEFINITELY

WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF YUSHIN CONSTITUTION
IN 1972, PRESIDENT ACHIEVED LONG-SOUGHT GOAL OF
EFFECTIVELY CONCENTRATING ALL SUBSTANTIVE POWER IN
PRESIDENCY. HE HAS CAREFULLY AND DELIBERATELY DESTROYED
POWER BASES OF OLDER POTENTIAL RIVALS AND
PREVENTED NEW ONES FROM EMERGING.

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PAK REMAINS A VISSIONARY, CONVINCED THAT HE
ALONE POSSESSES THE WISDOM AND ABILITY TO BUILD KOREA
INTO A MODERN SOCIETY AND THAT HE HAS MANDATE OF
HEAVEN TO CARRY THE STAGGERING BURDENS OF STATE.
SOME FEEL HE MAY WEARY AND EVENTUALLY STEP DOWN
VOLUNTARILY, PERHAPS WHEN HIS PRESENT TERM OF OFFICE
EXPIRES IN 1978. IF SO, THERE ARE NO SINS OF ANY
SUCH INTENTION AT PRESENT. INsofar AS HIS OWN
INTENTIONS ARE CONCERNED, WE WILL BE DEALING WITH
AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME HEADED BY PAK FOR
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

UNTIL PAK LEAVES OR IS FORCED FROM OFFICE,
THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF IMPROVEMENT IN AREA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS. HYPER-SENSITIVE
TO CRITICISM AND INTOLERANT OF DISSENT, PAK'S
NATURAL INCLINATION IS TO CUT DOWN THOSE WHO OPPOSE
OR EVEN DIFFER WITH HIM. HIS AUTHORITARIAN IMPULSE HAS
NOW BEEN STRENGTHENED BY LESSONS HE APPEARS TO HAVE
DRAWN FROM SOUTHEAST ASIAN COLLAPSE; THAT VIETNAM
AND CAMBODIA FELL BECAUSE GOVTS WERE WEAK AND FLABBY
AND RELIED TOO MUCH ON EXTERNAL HELP AND ADVICE,
DISSIDENCE WAS ALLOWED TO UNDERMINE NATIONAL WILL,
AND PEOPLE WERE UNPREPARED FOR STRUGGLE WITH SUPERIOR
COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE. TO PAK, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS ARE MERE SUBSIDIARY
ISSUES WHICH ARISE SOLELY BECAUSE HE IS FORCED, FOR
HIS OWN SURVIVAL AND NATION'S, TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
OVER HIS CRITICS AND OPPONENTS.

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4. ASSUMPTION III: THAT KOREAN MILITARY COMMAND IS
LOYAL TO PRESIDENT AND WILL OBEY HIS ORDERS

ROK ARMY IS ULTIMATE BASIS OF REGIME'S POWER. PAK
HAS LONG DEVOTED PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO ENSURING
MILITARY LOYALTY, INCLUDING CAREFUL CHOICE AND
EXTENSIVE SURVEILLANCE OF KEY COMMANDERS, INDOC-
TRINATION OF ALL RANKS TO REALITY OF NORTH KOREAN
THREAT, AND EXTENSION OF BENEFITS. WHILE
CYNICISM AND DISTASTE FOR MORE EXTREME ASPECTS OF
PAK'S AUTHORITARIANISM PROBABLY EXIST AT ALL LEVELS,
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF COUP PLOTTING WITHIN MILITARY
OR OF SERIOUS DISAFFECTION. MILITARY COMMANDERS
HAVE PROFESSIONAL OUTLOOK, TRADITIONALLY SUPPORT STATE
AND ITS CHIEFS AND DISDAIN POLITICS. THEY WOULD
PROBABLY SUPPORT PAK UP TO POINT THAT MASSIVE PUBLIC
DEMONSTRATIONS ERUPTED AGAINST HIM AND IT BECAME
NECESSARY TO USE LIVE AMMUNITION TO CONTROL THEM.
AT THAT POINT MILITARY, FEARFUL THAT NORTH KOREANS
WOULD SEIZE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK, WOULD PROBABLY
FORCE PAK TO STEP DOWN.

5. ASSUMPTION IV: THAT POLITICAL OPPOSITION OFFERS NO
SERIOUS CHALLENGE FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT

OPPOSITION NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP)
HAS DONE RELATIVELY WELL IN SERIES OF
NATIONAL ELECTIONS, BUT IT HAS VIRTUALLY NO TIES TO
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THE MILITARY AND ALMOST NONE TO BUSINESS; ITS LOCAL
CHAPTERS ARE WEAK AND POOR AND MOST OF ITS ASSEMBLYMEN
LACK RESOLVE AND ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO GOVERNMENT THREATS
AND BLANDISHMENTS. IT HAS LITTLE TO OFFER PUBLIC IN
POLICY TERMS OTHER THAN OPPOSITION TO PAK AND TO
HIS STYLE OF GOVERNMENT. LATTER INCLUDES ADVOCACY
OF GREATER DEMOCRACY, BUT THIS CONCEPT IS POORLY

DEFINED AND MEANS LITTLE TO GREAT MASS OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED IT.

KIM YONG-SAM, NDP'S CURRENT LEADER, IS ADMIRERD - ALBEIT GRUDGINGLY BY HIS INTRA-PARTY RIVALS - FOR BOLDNESS OF HIS EARLIER ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT, WHICH DID MUCH TO BURNISH NDP'S IMAGE AS TRUE PARTY OF OPPOSITION. TODAY, HOWEVER, PUBLIC PREOCCUPATION WITH THREAT FROM NORTH HAS FORCED EVEN KIM TO LINE UP BEHIND PAK'S DEMANDS FOR NATIONAL UNITY. MOREOVER, HIS HANDLING OF FACTIONAL DISPUTES WITHIN THE PARTY HAS BEEN LESS THAN ADROIT, AND HIS OVERWEENING AMBITION AND DISREGARD OF OTHERS' OPINIONS HAVE AROUSED REAL DOUBTS ABOUT HIS CAPABILITIES AS A NATIONAL LEADER. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP SCORNS AND MISTRUSTS KIM YONG-SAM AND WOULD GIVE HIM NO SUPPORT.

NONETHELESS, SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF URBAN EDUCATED POPULATION DO OPPOSE PAK'S REGIME AND MIGHT VIGOROUSLY SUPPORT OPPOSITION PARTY IF ONE EXISTED UNDER LEADERSHIP THAT COMMANDED THEIR RESPECT. WERE HE FREE TO DO SO, KIM TAE-CHONG MIGHT POSSIBLY PROVIDE THAT LEADERSHIP, BUT PAK IS WELL AWARE OF THIS AND WILL DO ALL WITHIN HIS CONSIDERABLE POWER TO PREVENT IT.

6. ASSUMPTION V: THAT PUBLIC HAS CONFIDENCE IN REGIME'S ABILITY TO MANAGE ECONOMY

SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH, AVERAGING 10 PERCENT OVER PAST TEN YEARS, HAS BEEN BASED ON DELIBERATE PLANNING FIRST TO PROMOTE LABOR-INTENSIVE LIGHT INDUSTRIES AND MORE RECENTLY TO MOVE INTO MORE SECRET

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MODERN HEAVY SECTOR. IT HAS TRANSFORMED KOREA AND PROVIDED REGIME PERHAPS ITS MOST IMPORTANT CLAIM ON PUBLIC SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE. WHILE NOT PERFECTLY DISTRIBUTED NOR FREE FROM INEQUITIES, BENEFITS HAVE REACHED ALL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY. REGIME, WELL AWARE OF POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND ACCOMPANYING RISE IN URBAN UNDEREMPLOYMENT, HAS TAKEN WELL PUBLICIZED MEASURES TO ALLEVIATE THOSE MOST DISTRESSED, AND IN MEANTIME HAS CONTINUED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE LOT OF RURAL AREA, FEATURING EXTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO AUGMENT RURAL INCOMES THROUGH SAEMAUL MOVEMENT AND BY MEANS OF GRAIN AND FERTILIZER SUBSIDIES. THERE IS ADMITTEDLY GREAT GAP BETWEEN VERY RICH AND VER POOR IN KOREA, AND SOME MAJOR SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY, E.G., MILITARY, URBAN WORKERS AT LOWER END OF SCALE, AND BUEAUCRATS, HAVE CAUSE

TO FEEL THEY HAVE NOT RECEIVED FULL SHARE AND THAT OTHERS, IN SOME CASES THROUGH CORRUPTION, HAVE BENEFITED MORE THAN THEY DESERVE. NONETHELESS, GOVERNMENT HAS CONSIDERABLE RESERVOIR OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT TO DRAW UPON.

SITUATION IS NOT WITHOUT POTENTIAL FOR DISSATISFACTION. CURRENT DIFFICULTIES HAVE CREATED SOME STRAINS WITHIN REGIME ITSELF, SHARPENING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AGGRESSIVE INDUSTRIAL PLANNERS IN BLUE HOUSE, WHO REFLECT PAK'S OWN DRIVE FOR RAPID GROWTH, AND CERTAIN ECONOMIC MINISTERS WHO MUST COPE WITH FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF SERIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION. CONTINUED SLOW GROWTH OF EXPORTS, AND HIGH RAW MATERIAL COSTS COULD LEAD TO FURTHER SHORTAGES OF IMPORTED GOODS, REDUCTIONS IN PRODUCTION AND INCREASED UNEMPLOYMENT. RESULT WOULD BE SEVERE DISAPPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC'S EXPECTATIONS, DISILLUSIONMENT WITH ECONOMIC POLICIES AND SERIOUS EROSION OF SUPPORT FOR REGIME. WHETHER THIS WILL OCCUR, OF COURSE, DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON EXTERNAL FACTORS OVER WHICH ROKG HAS NO CONTROL.

7. ASSUMPTION VI: THAT CORRUPTION IS WIDESPREAD BUT TOLERABLE, AND IS NOT SERIOUS CAUSE OF DISAFFECTION
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PROBLEM HERE IS THAT WE AT LOSS TO DEFINE WHAT, IN KOREAN TERMS, CONSTITUTES LEVEL OR NATURE OF PRACTICES BY OFFICIALDOM WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SERIOUS PUBLIC DISAFFECTION. CORRUPTION IN VARIOUS FORMS IS FOUND AT EVERY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND IS ENDEMIC THROUGHOUT SOCIETY. MOST THAT ONE CAN SAY IS THAT IT HAS NOT GREATLY INHIBITED KOREA'S ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH, THAT IT HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED WITHIN MILITARY (PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF SUPPLIES) SINCE ROKG ASSUMED MOST OF BUDGETARY BURDEN FOR DEFENSE, AND THAT IT IS ELSEWHERE TOLERABLE. PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS SOUGHT TO CREATE PUBLIC IMAGE OF OPPOSITION TO CORRUPT PRACTICES AND HAS PERSONALLY DEALT HARSHLY IN SOME INSTANCES. STILL, CORRUPTION AT HIGH LEVELS IS CONSTANTLY CITED BY OPPOSITION AS MAJOR CAUSE FOR PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND REGIME, BY CONDUCTING PERIODIC ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVES, APPEARS TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS EXISTENCE AS AT LEAST POTENTIAL THREAT TO ITS CONTROL. WE THUS CONCLUDE THAT ASSUMPTION IS BASICALLY VALID, BUT THAT REGIME WILL IGNORE POTENTIAL FOR DISAFFECTION OF CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ITS PERIOD, ESPECIALLY IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC STRAIN.

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8. ASSUMPTION VII: THAT STUDENT DISSIDENCE IS
UNCOORDINATED AND CAN READILY BE CONTROLLED

STUDENT DISSIDENCE IS PERENNIAL PHENOMENON WHICH
HAS ALWAYS LACKED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF POWER:
CENTRAL LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGICAL COHERENCE AND
EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION. TACTICS REFINED BY REGIME
OVER YEARS OF CONFRONTATION - SURVEILLANCE OF DISSIDENT
LEADERS, SUPPRESSION OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT VIEWS, AND
INFILTRATION OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS - HAVE PROVIDED
ADEQUATE TIME WHEN STUDENT THREAT DEVELOPS TO APPLY
RESTRAINTS THROUGH POLICE CONTAINMENT OF DEMONSTRATIONS,
ARRESTS OF LEADERS AND, WHEN NECESSARY, SCHOOL
CLOSURES. NONETHELESS, REGIME'S THRESHHOLD OF TOLERANCE
TOWARD ANY STUDENT DISSIDENCE IS LOWER NOW THAN EVER
BEFORE. EXPLANATION PROBABLY LIES IN KNOWLEDGE,
GAINED FROM 1960 EXPERIENCE, THAT STUDENT DISSIDENCE,
ONCE BEYOND CERTAIN BOUNDARIES, CAN BECOME CHAOTIC.
THEREFORE, REGIME'S PERCEPTION OF STUDENT DISSIDENCE
IS NOT AS ORGANIZED THREAT BUT AS MEANS FROM OR
THROUGH WHICH UNBOUNDED FORCES COULD PRECIPITATE
CRISIS OR CHAOS. LOW THRESHHOLD OF TOLERANCE
THUS PROBABLY STEMS FROM FEAR THAT THERE GREATER
POSSIBILITY NOW AND FOR FUTURE THAT STUDENT
DISSIDENCE COULD IGNITE MORE GENERALIZED URBAN
DISSATISFACTION WITH REGIME'S REPRESSION OR
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. FOR FUTURE THEN, STUDENTS
WILL REMAIN CUTTING EDGE OF OPPOSITION ON WHICH
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REGIME WILL EXERT TIGHTEST CONTROLS.

9. ASSUMPTION VIII: THAT ROK ARMED FORCES POSSESS
BOTH CAPABILITY AND WILL TO REPEL NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT NORTH KOREA WOULD NOT LAUNCH ATTACK UNLESS WELL PREPARED LOGISTICALLY TO FIGHT FOR REQUIRED DURATION. GENERAL ASSUMPTION THAT NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR ROK ARMED FORCES POSSESS CAPABILITY TO REPEL SUCH ATTACK DOES NOT BEAR CLOSE SCRUTINY; EACH OF ROK ARMED SERVICES SUFFERS FROM SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES, DESCRIBED IN GREAT DETAIL IN PROGRAM OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY JUSMAG-K ON FEBRUARY 18, 1975. DEFICIENCIES INCLUDE: FOR ARMY, WEAKNESSES IN LOGISTICAL SYSTEM, AIR DEFENSE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS, MOBILITY, TARGET ACQUISITION, BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE, AND FIRE POWER; FOR AIR FORCE, WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS, MODERN AIRCRAFT, OVERHAUL AND REPAIR FACILITIES, EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND WARNING FACILITIES, AND TACTICAL AIR CONTROL; AND FOR NAVY, GENERAL OBSOLESCENCE OF COMBAT VESSELS, SHIPYARD AND SHORE SUPPORT, AND ASW, FLEET AIR DEFENSE AND MINESWEEPING CAPABILITIES. ALL SERVICES LACK EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND EARLY WARNING FACILITY/CAPABILITY RE NORTH KOREA. INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION IS THAT U.S. WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE EARLY AND EXTENSIVE SUPPORT IN MOST OF ABOVE AREAS. ROK AND US PLANNING IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION SUCH SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED AND THAT AT MINIMUM U.S. AIR FORCES WILL BE COMMITTED TO COMBAT.

THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT ABOUT CURRENT WILL OF ROK MILITARY TO FIGHT AGAINST AGGRESSION OR WILL OF POPULACE TO SUPPORT IT. MILITARY IS INTENSIVELY TRAINED, HIGHLY DISCIPLINED, WELL-INDOCTRINATED AND INDIVIDUALLY AS TOUGH AND SKILLED AS ANY IN WORLD. RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS, PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM, AND WILLINGNESS TO ENDURE ARDUOUS CONDITIONS ALONG DMZ OVER LONG PERIOD OF TIME TESTIFY TO DEDICATION AND ESPRIT.

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HOWEVER, AS IN CASE OF CAPABILITY, MORALE AND WILL TO FIGHT COULD COLLAPSE IF AMERICAN SUPPORT WERE NOT PROMPTLY FORTHCOMING, ESPECIALLY IF SEOUL WERE CAPTURED OR SERIOUSLY THREATENED. KOREANS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT CHINESE AND/OR SOVIETS, WOULD PERMIT DPRK ATTACK TO FAIL FOR LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND WE KEENLY AWARE OF ADVANTAGE ENEMY HAS IN TERMS OF LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THAT IS WHY PAK AND OTHER KOREAN LEADERS SEEK GUARANTEES OF U.S. SUPPORT AND ARE FEARFUL OF IMPLICATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN PRESENT CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC MOOD TOWARD OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS, OF "CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES" LANGUAGE

OF SECURITY TREATY. CONCLUSION MUST BE THAT
WITHOUT A CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE AND PROMPT ACTION
IN EVENT OF ATTACK, ROK RESOLVE COULD QUICKLY
UNRAVEL.

10. ASSUMPTION IX: THAT KOREANS ARE NATI-COMMUNIST AND
PRO-AMERICAN AND THAT ANY SUCCESSOR REGIME WOULD WISH
TO RETAIN U.S. ALLIANCE

ANTI-COMMUNISM, BASIC NATIONAL POLICY SINCE
CREATION OF ROK, IS DEEPLY INGRAINED IN KOREAN
CONSCIOUSNESS. ATTITUDE IS PROBABLY MORE PROPERLY
IN NORTH, SINCE FEW KOREANS HAVE HAD
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ANTHING OF COMMUNIST DOCTRINE.
MOST EQUATE COMMUNISM WITH CALLOUS IMPOSITION OF
ALIEN VALUES ON NORTH KOREAN SOCIETY, FORCED
DIVISION OF NATION, RUTHLESSNESS WITH WHICH NORTH
TREATED CIVILIAN POPULATION DURING 1950 AGGRESSION,
AND FEAR OF REPETITION. ATTITUDE HAS BEEN
FOSTERED BY INTENSE OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA AND
STENGTHENED BY NORTH KOREA'S PROCLIVITY, AS IN
TUNNEL INCIDENT AND LENGTHY SERIES OF EARLIER
MILITANT ACTS AND STATEMENTS, TO MAKE CREDIBLE
REGIME'S CLAIM THAT THREAT OF ATTACK IS REAL AND
IMMINENT.

ANTI-COMMUNISM AND BELIEF IN REALITY OF
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THREAT FROM NORTH ARE NOT ONLY STOCKS IN TRADE
OF REGIME, BUT ARE PART OF PERSONAL CREED OF
VIRTUALLY EVERY KOREAN WHO HAS ANY DEGREE OF POLITICAL
AWARENESS. THERE ARE COMMUNISTS SYMPATHIZER
WITHIN POPULATION; HIGHEST NUMBER WE HAVE EVER HEARD
QUOTED WAS ASSEMBLY SPEAKER CHONG'S REMARKS TO
CONGRESSMAN FRASER THAT PERHAPS THREE MILLION FAMILY
MEMBERS WITH LONG TERM TIES TO COMMUNIST ELEMENTS
MIGHT ACCEPT A COMMUNIST RASLF. TTKAI AR

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YPTNPWWHON (#)

IF CLIMATE PERMITTED, WOULD

WISH TO EXPERIMENT WITH SOCIALIST OR COMMUNIST IDEAS,
AND STILL OTHERS WITHOUT PROPERTY OR OTHER STAKE IN
CURRENT SYSTEM WHO WOULD NOT OPPOSE A COMMUNIST REGIME.
BUT THEESE COMPRISE ONLY VERY SMALL MINORITY AND,
GIVEN STRONG SANCTIONS AGAINST DISPLAY OF SYMPATHY
FOR COMMUNIST OR EVEN SOCIALIST THOUGH AND STRONG

ANTI-COMMUNIST ATTITUDE OF GENERAL PUBLIC, THERE
VIRTUALLY NO GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT ROK NATIONAL
COHESION IS BEING UNDERMINED BY ATTRACTIONS OF
SYSTEM WHICH PREVAILS IN NORTH.

NOTE BY OC/T: SEOUL 4457/4. (#)AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION
TO FOLLOW.

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EXDIS

IN SIMILAR VIEN KOREANS REMAIN INTENSELY
PRO-AMERICAN. ON A RATIONAL PLANE, THIS DERIVES FROM
KNOWLEDGE THAT NATIONAL SECURITY DEPENDS ON U.S.
COMMITMENT, WHICH HAS BEEN FOSTERED BY SIEGE
MENTALITY WHICH ROKG POLCIES HAVE CULTIVATED. IT
STEMS ALSO FROM KOREAN WAR, SUCCESS OF U.S. ECF
IC#

V#
NEPQBROF PE#
YDNWO TIES ESTJ#
LISHEJ#

THROUGH EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES, MILITARY TRAINING,
MUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS, HISTORICAL ROLE OF MISSIONARIES
AND THE LIKE. THERE IS ALSO ADMIRATION FOR DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY WHICH LIBERATED KOREA FROM JAPANESE
DOMINATION AND APPEARED AT THAT TIME IMMENSELY
SUPERIOR IN EVERY WAY TO ANY OTHER. FINALLY, UNITED
STATES WAS NOT COLONIAL POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND
IS NOT TODAY VIEWED AS POTENTIAL THREAT TO KOREAN
ASPIRATIONS AS POWERS WHICH SURROUND ROK ARE.

IN FACT, KOREAN FEARS ARE NOT THAT U.S. WILL
REMAIN TO DOMINATE THEM, BUT THAT U.S. WILL WITHDRAW
ITS PRESENCE AND THAT ITS COMMITMENT CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON. INDO-CHINA DEBACLE HAS EXACERBATED THESE
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CONCERNS, WHICH REASSURANCES FROM U.S. LEADERS HAVE ONLY PARTIALLY EASED. HOWEVER DEEP SUCH DOUBTS MAY RUN, NEITHER PRESENT LEADERSHIP NOR ANY GROUP THAT IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED IT WOULD WISH TO WEAKEN U.S. PRESENCE UNLESS AND UNTIL KOREAN SECURITY WERE GUARANTEED BY OTHER MEANS. LATTER WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD INCLUDE KOREAN INSISTENCE ON MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY TREATY.

THIS SITUATION IS NOT IRREVERSIBLE. AT PRESENT, THOSE WHO ACTIVELY OPPOSED PAK REGIME APPEAR TO BELIEVE U.S. PRESENCE DETERS EVEN GREATER REPRESSION. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT SATISFIED THAT USG DOES ENOUGH TO PERSUADE PAK TO ALLOW GREATER POLITICAL FREEDOM, MANY RECOGNIZE THAT IN FINAL ANALYSIS KOREANS MUST SOLVE OWN DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. PAK'S MOST BITTER OPPOSITIONERS, WHO ADVOCATE THAT U.S. THREATEN TO WITHDRAW TROOPS AND SUSPEND ALL AID, DO SO NOT IN HOPE THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN, BUT IN BELIEF THAT FACED WITH SUCH ULTIMATUM, ROK MILITARY WILL FORCE PAK TO RESTORE DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES OR STEP ASIDE. HOWEVER. THERE ARE NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES IN CURRENT SITUATION WHICH COULD CAUSE ANTI-U.S. FEELING TO GROW. ONE WOULD BE CONTINUATION OR INTENSIFICATION OF REGIME'S REPRESSIVE POLICIES, AND FAILURE OF U.S. TO DISAVOW OR WORK TO AMELIORATE THEM. THIS FEELING IS ALREADY PRESENT AMONG THOSE WITH MOST DIRECT GRIEVANCES AGAINST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING EVEN SOME CHRISTIANS WHO HAVE FELT BRUNT OF REGIME'S ACTIONS. ANOTHER WOULD BE INTENSIFICATION OF FEELING THAT U.S. IS NOT RELIABLE AND IS WILLING SACRIFICE KOREAN INTERESTS TO LARGER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OR THAT PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WILL NOT SUPPORT CONTINUED U.S. IDENTIFICATION WITH FATE OF KOREA. FEARS OF POTENTIAL U.S. WITHDRAWAL (OR "BETRAYAL") HAVE ALREADY INSPIRED PAK AND HARD LINE SUPPORTERS TO EXAMINE EXTREME MEASURES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE "SELF-RELIANCE."

MORE FUNDAMENTAL IS QUESTION OF WHETHER
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POLITICAL STRUGGLE CAN REMAIN FROZEN INTO PRESENT CONFIGURATION, IN WHICH RELATIVELY WEAK FORCES ADVOCATING GREATER DEMOCRACY OPPOSE AUTHORITARIAN LEADER WHOSE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IS TO RETAIN AND EXERCISE ALL POWER. ROK IS IN EFFECT IDEOLOGICAL WASTELAND. DEMOCRACY, ALTHOUGH ADVOCATED BY ALLY WHOSE SUPPORT IS CRITICAL, HAS NEVER BEEN MORE THAN

IDEAL, ALBEIT PASSIONATELY HELD, BY SOPHISTICATED
MINORITY AND HAS NEVER REALLY BEEN PRACTICED. NOR
HAS YUSHIN SYSTEM, WHICH REGIME HAS ATTEMPTED TO
ESTABLISH AS COMPETING IDEOLOGY, AROUSED NATIONAL
COMMITMENT. IT IS ECONOMIC SUCCESS WHICH FORMS
BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE
POLITICAL FORCE, ANTI-COMMUNISM BASED ON FEAR,
ACTS AS IDEOLOGICAL GLUE TO BIND NATION TOGETHER.
SHOULD NORTH KOREA ADOPT POLICIES WHICH CAUSE THAT
FEAR TO SUBSIDE, SHOULD REGIME BECOME MORE
REPRESSIVE OR SUFFER SERIOUS ECONOMIC REVERSES,
AND SHOULD U.S. SUPPORT THEREUPON BE SEEN TO
WEAKEN, ONE CAN ONLY SPECULATE WHETHER SIGNIFICANT
ELEMENTS WITHIN KOREAN POPULATION WOULD NOT IN
FRUSTRATION BECOME VULNERABLE TO COMMUNIST
EXPLOITATION. SHOULD ANY OR ALL OF THESE FACTORS
COME INTO PLAY, THERE FORCE WOULD BE AUGMENTED BY
PULL OF PRESENT TREND THROUGHOUT ASIA
TOWARD ACCOMMODATION WITH COMMUNIST REGIMES
AND REJECTION OF ASSOCIATION WITH U.S.
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NOTE BY OCT: (#) AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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